The meaning of “home” is central to the protection against unlawful eviction under the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (Pie). The term is not defined in Pie and may extend beyond conventional residential property.
This raises an important question: can university accommodation—or even other university property occupied as shelter—become a student’s home?
The High Court considered this issue in University of Cape Town v S.M.L and Others [2026]. The case concerned whether students occupying a tent and vehicle in a university parking lot were protected by Pie, despite their occupation being unlawful and following an earlier eviction from a university residence.
UCT’s original eviction application
The University of Cape Town (UCT) offered five students accommodation at its Philip Kgosana residence in Mowbray for the 2024 academic year. They were informed that the arrangement would not extend throughout the year because maintenance was scheduled at the residence.
When the students failed to vacate, UCT obtained a court order requiring them to leave by 31 August 2025, failing which the sheriff was authorised to evict them.
After the students sought leave to appeal and an extension, negotiations resulted in a settlement agreement being made an order of court on 6 August 2025. They undertook to leave by 20 December 2025.
Shortly before that date, they brought three applications to stay the eviction, supported by affidavits explaining their personal circumstances and the risk of homelessness. All three applications were dismissed.
When they remained in occupation, the sheriff executed the order and placed their belongings in a UCT-owned parking lot. The students erected a tent there, parked a vehicle next to it and occupied both.
They did not dispute that their occupation of the parking lot was unlawful.
In February 2026, UCT returned to court seeking enforcement of the June and August 2025 orders.
Read the judgment: https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAWCHC/2026/193.html
Compelling the students to leave the parking lot
UCT sought four forms of relief:
- First, it asked the court to compel the students to vacate the parking lot and prohibit them from reoccupying any UCT property without permission.
- Second, relying on the common-law rei vindication, it sought to reclaim possession of the parking lot.
- Third, it asked that Campus Protection Services and the South African Police Service be authorised to remove the students and their belongings if they failed to leave.
- Lastly, it sought a final interdict against any future unlawful occupation of UCT property.
UCT argued that the students’ undertakings in the earlier eviction orders should be interpreted as extending beyond the Philip Kgosana residence to all UCT property. By moving into the parking lot, it contended, they acted in bad faith and disregarded those orders.
When is student accommodation a “home”?
UCT relied on Stay at South Point Properties (Pty) Ltd v Mqulwana and Others (UCT intervening as amicus curiae) [2023].
In that matter, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the purpose-built student accommodation concerned was not a “home” for Pie purposes.
Its reasoning rested on three features: the students had come from other homes to study; the accommodation was provided temporarily and for the limited purpose of facilitating study during the academic year; and equity required existing occupants to make way for incoming students within the broader higher-education framework.
UCT submitted that the students were therefore not entitled to Pie protection. In its view, their subsequent unlawful occupation of the parking lot, following breach of an undertaking to vacate the residence, could not attract greater protection.
The legal meaning of “home”
Section 26(3) of the Constitution provides that no person may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without a court order made after considering all relevant circumstances.
Pie gives effect to that protection, but does not define “home”. The court therefore considered earlier cases addressing the concept.
In Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker and Another v Jika [2002], the SCA referred to “any other form of temporary or permanent dwelling or shelter”.
In Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers, Newtown Urban Village [2012], a home was described as shelter against the elements that provides some comforts of life with a degree of permanence.
Barnett and Others v Minister of Land Affairs and Others [2007] (SCA) recognised that a person may have more than one home and emphasised regular occupation coupled with some permanence.
The High Court rejected UCT’s broad reading of Stay at South Point. That judgment did not establish an inflexible rule that Pie can never apply to student accommodation.
Rather, its application depends on the facts. If university accommodation has replaced a student’s previous home, or the student has no other home, the accommodation may constitute that student’s home and attract Pie protection.
The same principle may apply to other university property. Where the facts show that an unlawful occupier uses property—including a parking lot—as a home, Pie may apply. The nature and purpose of the occupation, rather than the property’s label, are decisive.
The court also held that the students’ undertakings to vacate the residence could not reasonably be interpreted as promises never to occupy any other UCT property. Even if the earlier orders had been breached, that could not remove Pie protection where the later occupation had, on the evidence, become their home.
Did UCT meet the test?
The court concluded that the parking lot had become the students’ home and that Pie applied. It was accordingly necessary to examine each student’s circumstances and assess whether eviction would cause homelessness.
The first respondent had already left the parking lot. The second and third respondents, who were married and had minor children, appeared in person. The second respondent had been accepted to study at UCT and placed at Obz Square residence, while the third respondent testified that she and the children no longer lived in the parking lot.
There was therefore no factual basis for relief against the first three respondents.
UCT relied on residential addresses recorded for the fourth and fifth respondents to argue that eviction would not leave them homeless. Their stay affidavits showed otherwise.
The fourth respondent stated that his mother had died, leaving him and his sister homeless. The fifth respondent stated that both his parents had died and that he likewise had no home to return to. The court found that UCT’s recorded addresses were no longer their residences.
Evicting the fourth and fifth respondents would therefore render them homeless. They were entitled to Pie’s protection, and UCT would have to bring a fresh eviction application under Pie.
The proceeding before the court was instead framed as an application to enforce earlier orders, which concerned the residence rather than the parking lot.
The court rejected the first three orders sought by UCT.
It also refused the final interdict: there was no evidence that the first three respondents intended to return to the parking lot or occupy other UCT property, and it would have been inappropriate to grant such broad relief against the remaining respondents in the circumstances. UCT’s application was dismissed, with no order as to costs.
The right to adequate housing
The judgment demonstrates the courts’ constitutional duty to safeguard against homelessness by considering the particular circumstances of each person facing eviction.
It also clarifies that Stay at South Point should not be treated as creating a blanket exclusion of student accommodation from Pie. The decisive question is factual: has the accommodation, or another place used as shelter, become that person’s home?
The decision does not mean that every university residence automatically qualifies as a home. Purpose-built student accommodation remains ordinarily temporary, purpose-specific and subject to rotation.
However, where a student can show that the accommodation has replaced their previous home, or that no alternative home exists, Pie may apply.
A university seeking eviction must then follow Pie’s procedural requirements and place sufficient information before the court to enable a just and equitable determination.
The judgment therefore develops the law by confirming that protection traditionally associated with tenants and other residential occupiers may, in appropriate circumstances, extend to occupants of educational institutions’ property.
Universities retain the right to manage scarce accommodation and recover unlawfully occupied property, but ownership alone does not displace constitutional safeguards where the property has become an occupier’s home.
For institutions, the practical lesson is to assess each occupier’s circumstances before choosing a remedy.
Reliance solely on the rei vindication or on an earlier order may be insufficient where later occupation has acquired the characteristics of a home.
Institutions should establish whether the occupier has alternative accommodation, whether eviction would result in homelessness, and whether vulnerable persons, including children, are affected.
Students, in turn, should not regard the judgment as permission to occupy university property unlawfully: Pie regulates eviction and requires judicial oversight, but does not legitimise unlawful occupation.
The ruling may also be relevant to future student-accommodation disputes, including those arising during campus protests or at the end of an academic year. Its application will remain fact-sensitive.
Courts must balance an institution’s operational need to allocate limited accommodation fairly against the constitutional imperative to prevent eviction into homelessness.
The essential enquiry will be whether the place occupied is, in substance, the student’s home and whether the proposed eviction is just and equitable after all relevant circumstances have been considered.
