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Saying “I resign” isn’t enough: High Court removes executor after estate grinds to a halt

An executor may say that he is resigning and he may even mean it. But as the KwaZulu-Natal Division of the High Court has recently reminded us, saying so does not make it so.
Image source: sean824 –
Image source: sean824 – 123RF.com

In this case a co-executor had repeatedly indicated that he wished to leave office, but no effective resignation or handover followed. Disputes over fees, indemnity, files and funds had become entangled with the administration. The matter ultimately ended in his removal.

Two years wait for a draft L&D account

MD Hopley (the deceased) passed away on 28 August 2021. His will made his surviving spouse, JC Hopley (Mrs Hopley), the sole beneficiary. It also appointed three co-executors: Mrs Hopley, her son RM Hopley (together referred to as “the applicants”) and JV Dua, an attorney.

Letters of Executorship were issued on 10 June 2022. On 8 December 2022, the applicants signed a power of attorney authorising Dua to act as their agent in winding up the estate.

According to Mrs Hopley, progress was slow and communication then dried up. She struggled to get information from Dua and her calls were not returned.

A draft liquidation and distribution account (L&D account) was only provided by Dua on 30 July 2024, more than two years after the Letters of Executorship had been issued.

When Mrs Hopley queried certain items, including R25m that formed part of the estate’s claim in a pending action against a certain Dr Pillay, Dua allegedly became infuriated and avoided communication.

From “I resign” to “not yet”

On 14 February 2025, Dua wrote to Mrs Hopley: “I suggest that we agree that I resign”.

Months later, the applicants’ attorneys, De Villiers Evans & Petit, asked him directly whether he intended to continue dealing with the estate. On 22 May 2025, he responded that he was preparing the files for collection and was “resigning”. He also announced that he would be charging a fee for the work done and a pro rata executor’s fee.

Then came the 180: after the applicants’ attorneys supplied the information he had asked for, Dua said that he would not release the files until his fees had been resolved and asked the family to propose a settlement figure.

The attorneys confirmed that he would be paid on taxation and offered that he retains enough in his trust account to cover his fees and disbursements in the meantime.

Dua replied that the attorneys were conflating his role as executor with his role as attorney, as executor’s fees are calculated as a percentage of the estate’s assets, and he alleged that the family had deliberately understated those assets.

After a formal notice of intended litigation, he said on 25 June 2025 that he would defer his resignation until the application was before the court, so that he could respond in his statutory capacity.

Resign? Only with an indemnity

Dua denied causing the delay, maintaining that the estate was far more complicated than the family suggested.

He pointed to uncertainty surrounding the deceased’s shareholdings in various companies, substantial sums allegedly loaned to Dr Pillay and trusts of which he was a trustee and a pending High Court action to recover those amounts.

He also alleged that the applicants had refused him access to the deceased’s computer and withheld instructions needed to pursue the litigation.

He further raised concerns about potentially undisclosed assets, unexplained share transfers, foreign currency transactions, rental income from the deceased’s UK properties and possible outstanding tax liabilities.

Dua maintained that these issues required investigation before the estate could be finalised, denied failing to account to the applicants and attributed the impasse largely to their conduct and the pending litigation. He remained willing to resign, provided he received an indemnity against potential liability arising from the issues he had identified.

His counsel argued that there was no alleged dishonesty, misappropriation of funds, maladministration or other wrongdoing, and that the asserted “undesirability” of Dua’s continued appointment had been created by the family themselves.

The applicants, for their part, sought his removal under section 54(1)(a)(v) of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 (the Act).

The test for removal

Section 54(1)(a)(v) of the Act empowers a court to remove an executor if it is satisfied that it is undesirable for him to act. The court was clear that removal is a “very drastic step” that it will not grant lightly.

It accepted Dua’s reliance on Oberholzer NO and Others v Richter as the correct authority, which confirms that mere disagreement or a breakdown in the relationship with an heir is not enough.

The applicants therefore bore the onus for the court to grant the relief. The court’s discretion was to be exercised with the interests of the estate and its beneficiary as the paramount consideration, and the focus was on the practical consequences of continued office rather than on moral blame.

Intending to leave is not leaving office

The court drew a careful distinction. It held that the February email was merely a proposal (“I suggest we agree”) and could not reasonably be construed as a resignation. The May email was different: Dua’s words “and am resigning” were, in the court’s view, unequivocal and the surrounding language reinforced that.

However, whether Dua clearly expressed his intention to leave is a separate question from whether he legally ceased to hold office. The court noted that the office of executor is a statutory one and that section 54(1)(b)(vi) provides for an executor to apply in writing to the Master to be released from office.

The evidence did not establish that Dua had legally resigned. His communication was nonetheless “highly relevant” to the desirability enquiry, though the court expressly did not treat it as a completed statutory resignation or as an admission of wrongdoing.

When administration becomes impossible

The court made no finding that Dua was dishonest and it found it unnecessary to decide that the delay was entirely attributable to him. It even accepted, for purposes of the enquiry, that the asset, tax and regulatory queries he raised were legitimate.

What it did find was that the working relationship between the co-executors had broken down seriously and that this had practical consequences.

Communications were running through attorneys, the files had not been handed over despite the indication that they would be and the parties had reached an acknowledged impasse. Files, funds, fees, indemnity and regulatory concerns had become “intertwined” in a manner that left the administration stalled.

The court concluded that Dua’s continued participation had become an “impediment to the orderly finalisation of the estate”. The testator’s choice of executor is entitled to weight, but the court held that it was not decisive where the objective evidence demonstrated “practical paralysis” in the winding up of an estate.

The finding rested on the cumulative effect of the prolonged non-finalisation, the serious and mutual breakdown in the working relationship, Dua’s repeated indications that he wished to relinquish office, the failure to achieve an effective handover and the entanglement of the disputes with the administration.

It did not rest on the breakdown alone.

Out as executor, costs out of his own pocket

Dua was removed as co-executor and directed to return his Letters of Executorship to the Master, who was ordered to issue fresh letters to the applicants.

Dua was directed to hand over the estate files, records and correspondence to the applicants’ attorneys and provide a written accounting of trust monies, receipts and disbursements connected with the estate. He was also interdicted from taking any further steps in its administration.

The order carefully distinguished between funds established to belong to the estate and monies whose ownership remained unresolved.

Estate funds had to be paid into the estate’s Nedbank account, while undetermined monies relating to the deceased were to be deposited into the applicants’ attorneys’ trust account, with the attorneys required to keep records of the amounts received.

The respondents were also directed to prepare a statement setting out the work performed by Dua and the fees and disbursements claimed, for assessment by the applicants’ attorneys and, if disputed, determination by the Master or the relevant competent body.

Finally, Dua was ordered to pay the costs of the application in his personal capacity, on Scale C, including the costs of two counsel where employed.

The court made it clear that the costs order was not punitive. The expense of resolving the impasse should not be borne by the estate or its sole beneficiary.

Lessons for executors and heirs

This judgment reminds both the public and legal practitioners that announcing a resignation is not the same as resigning.

An executor who remains in office while signalling that he wishes to resign risks having that signal weighed against him. It also illustrates that anyone nominated as an executor should carefully consider his or her duties before accepting the appointment.

Fee and indemnity disputes should be pursued through the proper channels and should not become entangled with the handover of an estate.

Heirs should note that removal of an executor is a drastic step which the courts will not grant lightly, and not merely because the relationship between executor and heirs has broken down.

The courts will, however, step in where the interests of the estate require it, as in this case, where the administration of the estate had become paralysed.

About Karel Kogler and Anelisa Zungu

Karel Kogler is an attorney, notary, conveyancer and specialist in Deceased Estate Administration, and Anelisa Zungu is a candidate attorney at Herold Gie Attorneys.
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